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By KM M. JOHNSON*
IN CONSIDERING the developments of the decade just past, this
article differs somewhat from the time honored character of the usual
law review article and is intended to be an analysis of current and
developing business practices and an excursion into preventive law.
Business Reasons for Increased Assignments
During the past ten years it has been obvious to the most casual
observer that California has experienced a tremendous increase in
population and a broad expansion of commerce and industry in every
direction. This has resulted in the assignment of contracts or the
assignment of contract proceeds in many areas, and such assignments
are usually in one way or another related to financing. No one who
buys an automobile under a conditional sale contract anticipates that
the contract will remain with the dealer. The buyer expects that the
contract will be assigned to a bank or finance company. The reason
for this is, of course, obvious. With any reasonable volume, it soon
becomes impossible for a dealer to retain his own paper. Assume that
there are 260 business days in a year and that a dealer averages the
sale of one car per day with an average deferred selling price of
3,000 dollars payable over a period of from twenty-four to thirty-six
months. This means that within a year the dealer will have approxi-
mately 700,000 dollars outstanding. Also the abilities of a particular
finance company will be strained to accommodate all of those desiring
to sell conditional sale contracts to it and the finance company itself
will be compelled either to resell the contracts to a bank or a larger
finance company, or to borrow on the security of the same. In either
case there is an assignment of contractual rights involved. While in
the example there has been a reference to motor vehicles, conditional
sale contracts are common in many other fields such as the sale of
refrigerators, stoves, television sets, etc. Nor is the conditional sale
contract limited to the consumer field. It has a place also in the sale
of nonconsumer equipment.
* B.A. 1925, Stanford University; J.D. 1928, Stanford University, School of Law;
Vice-President and Counsel, Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association; mem-
ber, California and American Bar Associations.
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As business increases and expands, so develops the need for addi-
tional financing by way of the sale or hypothecation of accounts re-
ceivable. Basically an account receivable represents the proceeds
arising out of a performed contract of sale. Here again problems of
assignment are involved.
The last ten years have seen the development of certain business
methods which are entirely new. One relating to the problem of as-
signments is the conviction of many manufacturers and processors
that it is more economical to rent machines and equipment rather than
to invest capital therein. As a result, leasing corporations have arisen
and they in turn obtain their financing through an assignment of the
lease and its rentals, or of the proceeds thereof to a financing institu-
tion. Quite often the conditional sale contract and the lease are com-
bined. A manufacturer will sell a large press to a leasing company
under a conditional sale contract. A bank will purchase the conditional
sale contract by way of assignment and may also take an assignment
of the lease rentals when the press is leased to the actual user. Ordi-
narily in this situation the financing agency looks primarily to the
credit of the user and his ability to pay the lease rentals rather than
to the credit position of the leasing company itself.
California during the past ten years has certainly had its share of
defense production. This has meant that in many cases the proceeds
of government contracts and of subcontracts have been assigned.
Another area in which assignments of contracts or of contractual
rights develop is when a going business is sold as a whole. The pur-
chaser in one way or another will succeed to the benefits and the
burdens of the various contractual relationships to which the seller is
subject.
The purpose of this article is to explore certain of the problems in
these areas to ascertain what if anything the California courts and
legislature have had to say, and to suggest certain precautionary
measures.
Applicable Law
California is a state in which rights of assignment are fully rec-
ognized both in statutes and in the decisions of the courts.' In fact
there is probably a certain amount of duplication in the California
statutes. For example, section 1458 of the Civil Code provides that
"... [A] right arising out of an obligation is the property of the person
to whom it is due and may be transferred as such." The following
I See, e.g., Communale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958), (assignment of a chose in action); Farmland Irr. Co. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d
208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957), (assignment of license rights).
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section provides that non-negotiable written contracts for the payment
of money may be transferred by endorsement in like manner with
negotiable instruments.2 This whole section is at least in part dupli-
cated by the provisions of Civil Code section 955 and section 955.1.
The first section refers to the transfer of a contract of conditional
sale or an obligation represented by a chattel mortgage or trust re-
ceipt, an obligation represented by a lease of personal property or a
non-negotiable instrument which is a note, bill of exchange or accept-
ance. The second section appears to be more or less of a blanket-section
covering anything that may have been omitted under section 955 and
which does not constitute an account receivable as defined in section
3017 of the Civil Code.3 Section 3017 rather broadly defines accounts
receivable and has a good many specific exceptions. 4 Anyone con-
templating the assignment of contract rights or of moneys due or to
become due under a contract should carefully evaluate all of these
sections since, to perfect an assignment of an account receivable as
against third party creditors, there must be a filing of a notice as pro-
vided in Civil Code sections 3018 and 3019. Recent decisions under
the statutes have held that accounts receivable to arise in the future
2 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1459.
3 CAL. Civ. CODE § 955.1 provides: "Except as provided in Section 955, and subject
to compliance with any applicable statute requiring recording or filing, the transfer of any
right to payment, not constituting an account as defined in Section 3017 of this code and
not constituting a negotiable instrument, shall be deemed perfected as against third per-
sons upon their being executed and delivered to the transferee an assignment thereof in
writing; provided, however, that as between bona fide assignees of the same right for
value without notice, the assignee first giving notice thereof to the obligor in writing
shall have priority; but such assignment shall not be, of itself, notice to the obligor so
as to invalidate any payments made by him to the transferor."
4 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3017 provides: "In this chapter: (1) 'Account' means a debt, due
or to become due, arising out of the sale, storage, transportation, care, repair, processing,
manufacture or other improvement of tangible personal property, or arising out of a con-
tract therefor, or arising out of the rendition of personal services which in the regular
course of business will result in an open book account; provided, however, that 'account'
does not include:
(a) Any debt evidenced by or arising under a judgment, note, bill of exchange,
acceptance, chattel mortgage, trust receipt, lease, or contract of conditional sale (meaning
a deferred payment contract reserving title in the seller);
(b) Any debt which arises from the sale of tangible personal property or from the
sale or assignment of the rents, issues, profits, products, proceeds or increase of tangible
personal property, if at the time of the assignment of such debt the assignee is the owner
of an encumbrance or a lien, other than a lender's lien pursuant to Section 3031 of the Civil
Code, upon the said personal property, which lien or encumbrance has been duly per-
fected against third persons pursuant to any applicable state or federal law or is so per-
fected within 10 days after the assignment of such debt;
(c) Any debt arising under a contract for a work of improvement to real property
as defined in Section 1182 of the Code of Civil Procedure or a public work of improve-
ment as defined in Section 4200 of the Government Code...."
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and moneys to become due in the future are freely assignable.5
Waiver of Defenses
In view of the relatively satisfactory condition of California statutes
and cases one may well ask where are the areas of difficulty? One area
not entirely clear is the attempt to provide that if the contract is as-
signed, then the assignee may take the contract free and clear of cer-
tain defenses which the other party may have against the assignor.
In other words, what is the effect of attempts by way of agreement to
give a non-negotiable contract the qualities of a negotiable instrument?
In general an assignee stands in the shoes of his assignor; however
when financing is involved the assignee may desire to be placed in
the position of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument and
thus have rights superior to those of his assignor. Questions have also
arisen where the contract itself contains specific provisions against
assignment. Section 1589 of the Civil Code has given rise to decisions
that are difficult to reconcile. Assignment of the proceeds of govern-
ment contracts presents certain problems not found in other situations.
Occasionally problems in the assignment field have developed out of
the use of imprecise language by the parties.
While the practice in California is not uniform, certain conditional
sale contracts provide that if the contract is assigned, then the person
obligated to pay will pay the assignee regardless of any defenses he
may have against the assignor and will look only to the assignor as
to his claim. In other jurisdictions the cases have gone both ways as
to the validity of such clauses. Some have held them completely in-
valid as being contrary to public policy. The one reported case in
California which bears on this matter is Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Orange County Mach. Works.6 In this case certain equipment had
been sold and a conditional sale contract taken. Also evidencing the
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price were promissory
notes. The notes were sold by the original seller of the equipment to
the plaintiff. In an action for a deficiency after repossession and sale,
the defendant was allowed to introduce defenses which he normally
would not have been permitted to introduce in an action by a holder
in due course of the notes.- The court seemed to base its decision
on the general overall intimacy of the plaintiff to the transaction.
5 E.g., H. S. Mann Corp. v. Moody, 144 Cal. App. 2d 310, 301 P.2d 28 (1956).
6 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
7 The facts in the case indicated that plaintiff was a holder in due course as defined
in CAL. CrV. CODE § 3133, who normally would be free from the defenses available to
prior parties between themselves by virtue of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3138. Sections 3133 and
3138 are codifications of UNIFOmm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw §§ 52 and 57.
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The only other case in this area in California is United States v.
Klatt.8 This case involved an F.H.A. Title I loan in which a promis-
sory note was given to a contractor performing certain work and the
note was assigned to a bank and subsequently to the United States
of America. A completion certificate was required upon completion of
the work. This apparently was forged, and the work was not com-
pleted satisfactorily. The United States government maintained that
it had the rights of a holder in due course under the shelter doctrine
since the bank was a holder in due course. The court rejected this
argument, stating that the bank had supplied the forms and "... . that
the relationship between the payee named in the instrument in suit
and the bank, as to the entire transaction giving rise to the instrument,
was such that the bank must be considered in effect a party to the
original transaction between the named-payee dealer and the defend-
ant; and the bank could not therefore, in any event, be deemed a
holder in due course of any negotiable instrument executed as a part
of the transaction."9
It might be noted that the above language does not appear to be
completely supported by the analysis of the facts in the case. How-
ever, it must be recognized that both the Orange County Machine
Works case and the Klatt case evidence a feeling on the part of the
California courts not to give conditional sale contracts the quality of
negotiable instruments even though the device of promissory notes be
utilized. If this is so, the courts could well look with disfavor upon
contractual provisions in conditional sale contracts which waive de-
fenses as against an assignee of the contract and its proceeds. Cer-
tainly on the consumer level it can be anticipated that this could well
be the attitude of the courts.
As a matter of fact in California it has not been the universal
practice (as in some states) to insert waiver of defense clauses in
conditional sale contracts. This fact may explain the lack of decided
cases on this point in California. On the other hand where personal
property leases are involved it is more or less universal practice to
have such provisions in the lease itself or in the acknowledgment of
the assignment by the lessee. A typical provision taken from a printed
form currently in use for motor vehicle transactions in California is
as follows:
* 12. ASSIGNMENT: Lessee will not, without the prior
written consent of Lessor and Lienholder, assign this Lease or
sublet any vehicle leased hereunder. Lessor may assign and
8 135 F. Supp. 648 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
9Id. at 650.
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pledge to Lienholder all rentals due and becoming due here-
under and pursuant to any and all Lease Schedules hereto and
all other sums payable by Lessee to Lessor, and in such event
Lessee agrees that: (a) Lienholder's right to receive such
rentals and other sums shall be free from all defenses, setoffs,
counterclaims and other claims and demands which Lessee may
be entitled to assert against Lessor, and no breach or default
of any agreement, including this Lease, between Lessor and
Lessee, and whether pertaining to the maintenance, service,
repair or warranty of any vehicle leased hereunder, or other-
wise, shall excuse, diminish, modify or amend Lessee's obliga-
tion to pay Lienholder; and (b) Lienholder does not assume
and shall not be obligated to perform any obligation or covenant
of Lessee hereunder or pursuant to any Lease Schedule hereto,
or otherwise; except to account for any Deposit made by Lessee
or Pre-Termination Rental Adjustment Credit coming into Lien-
holder's possession.
Where the transaction is on a nonconsumer level it appears that
there can be no serious objection to such provisions on the basis
of public policy. Considering the overall transaction, the lessee has
obtained the property he desires and the lending institution has
provided the necessary financing. Certainly the financing institution
should have a fair degree of assurance that its advances will be repaid.
The financing institution of course does look to the lessor who has
assigned the proceeds of the lease and usually has signed a promissory
note; however, from the overall credit viewpoint the financing insti-
tution is looking to the lessee rather than to the lessor because the
lessor's obligations soon become quite excessive in relation to its assets.
This consumer-nonconsumer distinction is the solution adopted by
Uniform Commercial Code section 9-206, reading in part as follows:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer that he
will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he
may have against the seller is enforceable by an assignee who takes
his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a claim
or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be asserted
against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the
Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of
one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement makes such an agreement.
California has adopted in part such legislation prohibiting to a
large extent such waivers in conditional sale contracts in what are
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
termed retail transactions." °
In summary, certain doubt exists in California as to the enforce-
ability of such waivers of defenses. However, it would appear that
they probably will and should be valid except on the consumer level.
Prohibitions Against Assignment
Contracts containing prohibitions both as to the assignment of
contract rights and of the proceeds thereunder are frequently found
in current commercial practice in California. A typical example would
be a contract between the suppliers of certain particular parts or
equipment and a large airframe manufacturer. The airframe manu-
facturer simply does not want to be bothered with any possibility of
dealing with others than the actual contractor, nor does the manu-
facturer care to place itself in a position where it might not be able
to offset against amounts due the contractor. As a result large num-
bers of such contracts contain provisions prohibiting not only an as-
signment of the contract, but also of the proceeds.
In the first place it seems clear that as between the parties such
provisions are completely effective and that regardless of the general
policy of the California law as to freedom of assignment, there is no
reason why parties cannot agree that there will be no assignment,
even as to proceeds.:1
A rather peculiar problem develops when the contractor desires
financial assistance and obtains this by assigning to a financing insti-
tution the proceeds of a contract containing a prohibition against such
an assignment. Such proceeds, of course, constitute accounts receiv-
able and a security interest in such accounts receivable may be per-
fected by the filing of notice and without actual notification given to
the person who owes the account receivable. 1 2 In Bass v. Aetna Factors
Co.'s the court had before it a case where such an assignment had been
made, and notice filed by the assignee. The dispute thereafter arose
when the contractor went into bankruptcy. Certain proceeds of as-
signed contracts were paid to the trustee in bankruptcy, and the ob-
vious conflict arose between the trustee and the assignee financing
institution. The final determination was that the financing institution
was entitled to these funds rather than the trustee in bankruptcy.
In connection with the above, there remains one situation where
there are no California cases. Suppose, for example, in a contract case
of this nature the person obligated to pay the account receivable does
:O CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1804.1, 1804.2.
31 Parkinson v. Caldwell, 126 Cal. App. 2d 548, 272 P.2d 934 (1954).12 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3017, 3029.
13272 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1959).
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not so pay, and an action is brought by the assignee financing institu-
tion. What the result would be is not certain at the present time.
Generally speaking, contracts containing prohibitions against as-
signment of proceeds use language something similar to "this contract
and the proceeds thereunder shall not be subject to assignment."
Query, would the result of the Bass case be different if the language
was stronger and declared that any assignment of proceeds is void
and shall be invalid and of no force and effect whatever?"
There may also be cases where, because of somewhat ambiguous
language, a contract may be interpreted as prohibiting assignment.
A recent case of this nature is Ott v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n.15 In
this case a savings and loan association forwarded to S a document
reading in part as: 16
This letter is to serve as a binding commitment for a period of
three years from date hereof, upon [the] Savings and Loan Associa-
tion to make to you or your nominee the following loans:
... [a specified amount of "G.I." guaranteed loans].
In addition, the association agrees to purchase from you or your
nominee... [a specified amount of "G.I." loans].
Just prior to the end of the three year period S appointed 0 as
his nominee under the commitment and assigned to 0 all rights arising
under the commitment. 0 communicated with the Association in-
forming it of O's nomination by S and actually tendered a certain
amount of loans which were accepted. Apparently the Association
dealth with 0 for approximately a month and then informed 0 that
it would no longer purchase loans. 0 filed an action against the Asso-
ciation and the court held that 0 could not recover. The court rea-
soned that the letter to S was not a contract, but was merely an offer;
however, apparently the real basis of the decision was that even though
a contract had been created, nevertheless it was nonassignable. The
court decided that the phrase "or your nominee" was used to indicate
the contract's nonassignability because the term "nominee" designated
a person who would take in a representative capacity rather than as
owner. Probably the real import of this case is its indication of the
continuing necessity of giving careful attention to precise phrasing
in contract transactions.
14 For cases which upheld the provision against assignment when the provision was
that any assignment shall be "void" see Allhusen v. Caristo Const. Co., 303 N.Y. 446, 103
N.E.2d 891 (1952) and Sacks v. Neptune Meter Co., 238 App. Div. 82, 263 N.Y. Supp.
462 (1933), 21 FORDHAm L. REv. 178 (1952), distinguishing a provision that an assign-
ment shall be void from a covenant not to assign.
15265 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1958).
16 Id. at 644.
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Effect of Civil Code Section 1589
California Civil Code section 1589 reads as follows: "A voluntary
acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to
all the obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or
ought to be known, to the person accepting."
During the past ten years there has been a certain division of
authority as to the interpretation of this section. One view, and this
is certainly the majority view, is that the section applies only where
the person accepting the benefit was a party to the original transaction.
This is the position taken in the fairly recent cases of King v. Curtis,17
and Fruitvale Canning Co. v. Cotton.'s
In the Fruitvale case the canning company advanced money to
the first defendant who operated a saw mill. It was agreed that the
loan would be repaid by the delivery of shook to the cannery. Prior
to the performance of this contract the first defendant sold his business
to a second defendant, and the second defendant performed for a
while under the original contract and then ceased. The court held
that the second defendant was not liable on the ground that although
in a sense he had accepted the benefits, he was not a party to the
original transaction.
Another case which indicates a somewhat contrary line of think-
ing, and which again involved the sale of a business, is Gregers v.
Peterson Ice Cream Co.19 In this case plaintiff and the first defendant
entered into a contract whereby plaintiff was given a certain territory
in which to sell defendant's products. Later the first defendant sold
its business to the second defendant who continued to supply the
plaintiff for a period of time. The court held that the second defendant
was obligated under the original contract to continue to supply the
plaintiff, finding that under the circumstances the second defendant
intended to assume the obligations of the original contract. The court
specifically cited section 1589 of the Civil Code. These two cases indi-
cate again the necessity of specific language manifesting the intent of
the parties.
Assignment of Proceeds of Government Contracts
Originally contract claims against the United States government
were not subject to assignment; however, in 1940 the Assignment of
Claims Act 20 was passed, permitting assignment to banks, trust com-
panies and other financing institutions. This was specifically done to
17 133 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 806, 284 P.2d 983 (1955).
Is 115 Cal. App. 2d 622, 252 P.2d 953 (1953).
19 158 Cal. App. 2d 746, 323 P.2d 572 (1958).
20 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958).
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provide financial assistance for government contractors. Conflicts have
arisen because most governmental contracts require a performance
and a payment bond, and the bonding company generally takes an as-
signment of the contract proceeds even though the assignment is one
not permitted under the federal statute. In passing it should be noted
that the federal government may waive its right of offset where con-
tract proceeds are assigned if a national emergency exists. As of the
time this article was written, the Department of Justice has indicated
that the national emergency proclaimed by President Truman on De-
cember 16, 1950, has not been terminated.
To take a fairly typical situation, suppose that a contractor under
a government contract has provided the required payment and per-
formance bonds under the terms of the Miller Act. 21 As part of the
process of obtaining the bond the contractor assigns the contract pro-
ceeds to the surety company. Subsequently the contractor again as-
signs the proceeds to a financing institution, and there is full compliance
at this stage with the Assignment of Claims Act. After all of this has
occurred, the contractor defaults and the surety is required to perform
the uncompleted part of the contract and to satisfy the claims of labor
and materialmen. At the time of default, the government will be
holding funds which represent earned progress payments not yet dis-
bursed and retained percentages of progress payments already paid.
Certainly upon default any progress payments earned thereafter are
payable to the surety because it is the party that is actually performing
the contract. The financing institution usually finds itself in a position
where it needs the retained percentages and the earned but unpaid
progress payments in order to satisfy the loans it has made to the
contractor. Throughout the United States there has been a consider-
able amount of litigation in this situation. Under most factual situa-
tions, at least as to the earned progress payments, the financing insti-
tution has prevailed in contests with the surety.22 A leading case to
the contrary is National Sur. Corp. v. U.S.23 In so far as the Ninth
Circuit is concerned, the court of appeal has indicated that the financ-
ing institution would prevail at least as to payments already paid to
the lender.24 This result seems sound although the court mentioned
in this case that the bank did not have notice of the prior assignment.2 5
This distinction would appear immaterial if the assignment to the
21 49 Stat. 793 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1958).
22 See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Hinds, 260 F.2d 366 (10th Cir. 1958); General
Cas. Co. v. Second Nat'l Bank, 178 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1950).
23 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. CI. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 902 (1956).
24 Bank of Arizona v. National Sur. Co., 237 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1956).
25 Id. at 96.
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bank was permitted and perfected according to law while the assign-
ment to the surety was not recognized and could not be perfected.
The various possibilities in this area have not been fully explored
in the Ninth Circuit, and as a result it must be recognized that the
law is somewhat unsettled in so far as this circuit is concerned. Neither
is there any comprehensive determination by the United States Su-
preme Court.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is recognized that this article may have raised
more questions than it has settled. However, as indicated at the out-
set, the primary purpose was to trace the business developments of the
past ten years and to indicate some of the shoals and bars that have
been discovered as commerce explores new areas.
